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CHAPTER 27

THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION
OF SELF
KENNETH J. GERGEN

In treating the social construction of self it is first necessary to identify the
boundaries of the domain. At the outset, there is the matter of the self. History
has prepared us to speak of the self in many different ways, and some of these are
more central to constructionist concerns than others. My particular concern in the
present chapter will be with a family of uses that generally refer to a psychological
or mental world within the individual. The members of this family are many and
varied. We variously speak of persons as possessing mental concepts of themselves,
and it is often said that these concepts are saturated with value, that they may be
defective or dysfunctional, that they figure importantly in the individual’s rational
calculus, and that they ultimately supply resources for the exercise of personal
agency. And too, many simply identify the process of conscious choice as equiva
lent to the individual self. Such assumptions are deeply embedded in Western
culture, and provide the under-girding rationale for practices of jurisprudence,
childrearing, education, counseling, and psychotherapy, among others. Further,
such assumptions furnish the basis for myriad research studies in psychology and
sociology. Individual self-esteem, for example, has been one of the most intensively
studied topics in psychology. Indeed, the Western traditions of democracy and
capitalism are both wedded to conceptions of the individual self as alluded to
above.
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With this particular focus on self in place, I shift attention to the matter of social
construction. In this case, it is important to outline some of the major assumptions
that play themselves out in contemporary constructionist scholarship. The ground
is then prepared for treating issues in the social construction of the self. Here I will
begin with a discussion of the ungrounded character of mental accounts in general.
Following this, I will discuss major lines of inquiry into the social construction of
self, along with its socio-political implications. Finally, I will introduce an alterna
tive to traditional conceptions of self, one that emerges distinctly from social
constructionist theory.

The Emergence of Social
Constructionist Theory
There are many stories to be told about the development of social constructionism
in scholarly worlds. I offer here but one, although one that is congenial with much
common understanding. To be sure, one may trace the intellectual roots of social
constructionism to Vico, Nietzsche, Dewey, and Wittgenstein, among others. And
Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1966) was a landmark
volume with strong reverberations in neighboring disciplines. However, the social
movements and intellectual ferment taking shape in the late 1960s in the United
States and Western Europe were perhaps more influential in paving the way to
social construction in psychology. Resistance to the Vietnam War and to the
country’s political leadership was intense; profound skepticism of the established
order was voiced. Much of the academic community was deeply engaged in
political protest. The context was optimal for reassessing the established rationale
and practices within the sciences and other scholarly traditions. In brief, one can
locate at least three major forms of broadly shared critique that resulted from such
reassessment. Each of them found expression in the psychological literature. Most
importantly, the amalgamation of these forms of critique—sometimes identified
with postmodernism—largely serves as the basis for most social constructionist
inquiry in the scholarly world today. 1
Perhaps the strongest and most impassioned form of critique of the dominant
orders has been, and continues to be, ideological. In this case, critics challenge
various taken-for-granted realities in society and reveal the political ends that they
1 For a more detailed account of these critiques within psychology, see Gergen (1994b). Additional
accounts of social constructionist premises and potentials may be found in Potter 1996; Gergen 2009;
Hacking 1999.
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achieve. In effect, such analysis discloses the socio-political consequences of the
sedimented accounts of reality, in the attempt to liberate the reader from their
subtle grasp. Within the scholarly world more generally, such ‘unmasking’ has
played a major role in Marxist scholarship, along with anti-psychiatry, feminist,
racial, gay and lesbian, and anti-colonialist movements, among others.
The second major form of critique may be viewed as literary/rhetorical. With
developments in semiotic theory in general and literary deconstruction in particu
lar (Derrida 1976), attention was variously drawn to the ways in which linguistic
convention governs all claims to knowledge. Thus, whatever reality posits one puts
forward, they will bear the marks of the linguistic forms (including, for example,
grammatical rules, narrative conventions, and binary distinctions) necessary for
communication. In this sense the forms of language are not driven by reality so
much as they provide the forestructure for what we take to be its nature.
The third significant critique of foundational science was stimulated largely by
the 1970 publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn
portrayed normal science as guided by paradigms of thought and practice shared
by particular communities. In effect, the outcomes of science were not demanded
by the world as it is, but are the result of communal negotiation. This social
account of science was further buttressed by a welter of research in the sociology
of knowledge and the history of science (see e.g. Feyerabend 1978; Latour and
Woolgar 1986).2 Although these movements largely originated within separate
scholarly spheres, scholars increasingly discovered affinities among them. In effect,
one could recognize the contours of a broader movement, often identified as social
constructionist. Within this movement, three domains of agreement are notewor
thy: the social origins of knowledge, the centrality of language, and the politics of
knowledge.

The social origins of knowledge
Perhaps the most generative idea emerging from the constructionist dialogues is
that what we take to be knowledge of the world and self finds its origins in human
relationships. What we take to be true as opposed to false, objective as opposed to
subjective, scientific as opposed to mythological, rational as opposed to irrational.

2 It should be noted that the term constructivism is sometimes used interchangeably with
constructionism. However, unlike social construction, early scholars tended to define constructivism
in terms of cognitive processes within the individual mind. For these theorists the focus was placed on
the individual’s perceptions and interpretative capacities as the originating source of their
constructions of the world. Recent scholarship has made it increasingly difficult to sustain the
distinction between constructivism and constructionism. Constructivists increasingly view mental
practices as reflections or embodiments of social process. Many now speak of social constructivism, or
use the terms interchangeably.
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moral as opposed to immoral is brought into being through historically and
culturally situated social processes. This view stands in dramatic contrast to two
of the most important intellectual and cultural traditions of the West. On the one
hand is the tradition of the individual knower, the rational, self-directing, morally
centered, and knowledgeable agent of action. Within the constructionist dialogues
we find that it is not in the individual mind that knowledge, reason, emotion, and
morality reside, but in relationships.
The communal view of knowledge also represents a major challenge to the view
of Truth, or the possibility that the accounts of scientists, or any other group, reveal
or approach the objective truth about what is the case. In effect, propose the
constructionists, no one arrangement of words is necessarily more objective or
accurate in its depiction of reality than any other. To be sure, accuracy may be
achieved within a given community or tradition—according to its rules and
practices. Physics and chemistry generate useful truths from within their commu
nal traditions, just as psychologists, sociologists, and priests do from within theirs.
But from these often-competing traditions there is no means by which one can
locate a transcendent truth, a ‘truly true’. Any attempt to determine the superior
account would itself be the outcome of a given community of agreement.
To be sure, these arguments have provoked antagonistic reactions among scien
tific communities in particular. There remains a substantial number in the scien
tific community, including the social sciences, who still cling to a vision of science
as generating ‘Truth beyond community’. For scientists who see themselves as
generating pragmatic or instrumental truths, constructionist arguments are quite
congenial. Thus, for example, both would agree that while Western medical science
does succeed in generating what might commonly be called ‘cures’ for that which is
termed ‘illness’, these advances are dependent upon culturally and historically
specific constructions of what constitutes an impairment, health and illness, life
and death, the boundaries of the body, the nature of pain, and so on. When these
assumptions are treated as universal—true for all cultures and times alternative
conceptions are undermined and destroyed. To understand death, for example, as
merely the termination of biological functioning would be an enormous impover
ishment of human existence. The constructionist does not abandon medical
science, but attempts to understand it as a cultural tradition—one among many.

The centrality of language
Central to the constructionist account of the social origins of knowledge is a
concern with language. If accounts of the world are not demanded by what there
is, then the traditional view of language as a mapping device ceases to compel.
Rather, following Wittgenstein (i953)> a view of language is invited, in which
meaning is understood as a derivative of language use within relationships. And,
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given that games of language are essentially conducted in a rule-like fashion,
accounts of the world are governed in significant degree by conventions of language
use. Psychological research could not reveal, for example, that ‘motives are oblong’.
The utterance is grammatically correct, but it is cultural nonsense. Rather, while it
is perfectly satisfactory to speak of motives as varying in intensity or content,
conventions of talk about motivation in the twenty-first century do not happen to
include the adjective, ‘oblong’. Expanding on this point, many constructionists see
attempts at generating philosophical foundations for scientific study as forms of
language games. For example, the long-standing question of whether and to what
degree the mind has access to the external world—the central problem of episte
mology—is a problem only within a given game of language (see Rorty 1979). To
play the game we must agree that there is a ‘mental world’ on the one hand and a
‘material world’ on the other (an ‘in here’ and ‘out there’), and that the former may
possibly reflect the latter. If one does not agree to play by these rules, there is no
‘problem of individual knowledge’.
Of special relevance to an understanding of research methods, constructionists
also tend to accept Wittgenstein’s view of language games as embedded within
broader ‘forms of life’. Thus, for example, the language conventions for communi
cating about human motivation are linked to certain activities, objects, and
settings. For the research psychologist there may be ‘assessment devices’ for
motivation (e.g. questionnaires, thematic analysis of discourse, controlled observa
tions of behavior), and statistical technologies to assess differences between groups.
Given broad agreement within a field of study about ‘tbe way the game is played’,
conclusions can be reached about the nature of human motivation. As construc
tionists also suggest, playing by the rules of a given community is enormously
important to sustaining these relationships. Not only does conformity to the rules
affirm the reality, rationality, and values of the research community, but the very
raison d’etre of the profession itself is sustained. To abandon the discourse of the
mind would threaten the discipline of psychology; to dispense with the discourse of
social structure would threaten the collapse of sociology. Without conventions of
construction, action loses value.

The politics of knowledge
As indicated above, social constructionism is closely allied with a pragmatic
conception of knowledge. That is, traditional issues of truth and objectivity are
replaced by concerns with that which research brings forth. It is not whether an
account is true from a god’s eye view that matters, but rather, the implications for
cultural life that follow from taking any truth claim seriously. This concern with
consequences essentially eradicates the long-standing distinction between fact and
value, between is and ought. The forms of life within any knowledge-making
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community represent and sustain the values of that community. In establishing
‘what is the case’, the research community also place value on their particular
metatheory of knowledge, constructions of the world, and practices of research.
When others embrace such knowledge they wittingly or unwittingly extend the
reach of these values.
Thus, for example, the scientist may use the most rigorous methods of testing
intelligence, and amass tomes of data that indicate racial differences in intelligence.
However, the presumptions that there is something called ‘human intelligence’,
that a series of question and answer games reveal this capacity, and that there are
separable ‘races’ in the world, are all specific to a given tradition or paradigm. Such
concepts and measures are not required by ‘the way the world is. Most importantly,
to accept the paradigm and extend its implications into policy within the tradition
is deeply injurious to those people classified as inferior by its standards.
This line of reasoning has had enormous repercussions in the academic com
munity and beyond. Drawing sustenance in particular from Foucault’s (1978,1979)
power/knowledge formulations, one comes to understand that the realities, ration
alities, and values created within any social enclave have socio-political ramifica
tions. And particularly because those within a given interpretive community
seldom appreciate that their realities are local and contingent, there is a strong
tendency toward reification. Those who fail to share the local realities and values
are thus viewed as misled, ignorant, immoral, and possibly evil. In effect, with the
process of reality building set in motion, the result is often social division and
antagonism. Each tradition of the real becomes a potential enemy to all those who
do not share in the tradition. To illustrate, experimental psychologists are generally
committed to a causal view of human action, and view the experimental method as
the most valuable means of demonstrating cause-effect relations. There is little
doubting these assumptions and practices; they are simply taken for granted.
However, this form of life cannot accommodate the concept of human agency.
To include an uncaused cause within the formulations would destroy a way of life.
At the same time, to embrace the experimental way of life is to threaten the
legitimacy of claims to voluntary action and thus a tradition of moral responsibility.
With this background in place, we may now turn to more specific concerns with
the self.

Mental Discourse in Question
The term ‘self’ is employed in many different settings, and for different purposes,
and in this sense is richly polysemic. On the present account, all such meanings
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are essentially constructed within social enclaves. However, the more difficult task
is to remove the sediment sense of the real accumulating from long-standing
usages. It is only when the painstaking work of denaturalizing has taken place that
one is liberated from the past, and thus positioned to reformulate as conditions
require. It is in this context that I wish to focus specifically on the self as a
constituent member in the family of mental discourse. Over the past three
centuries Western culture has developed an enormous vocabulary referring to
mental states, mechanisms, processes, or conditions. Although subject to long
standing contention within philosophy (see e.g. Almoq 2005; Ryle 1949), for most
people there is little doubting the existence of the world created by these terms.
We readily speak of one’s thoughts, desires, emotions, and motives, in the same
way we refer to one’s ‘self-image’, ‘self esteem’, ‘self love’, and ‘voluntary choice’. As
indicated earlier, these ‘realities’ are insinuated into the rationale for many of the
major institutions and traditions of Western culture. In what follows I wish to
outline some of the major problems inhering in the attempt to anchor the
discourse of the psychological self in an independent world of existents. This
brief account should move toward unsettling existing assumptions. In the follow
ing section we explore some of the major means by which the psychological self is
constructed. These explorations will set the stage for considering alternatives to
the psychological conception of self.
As proposed, we typically employ such terms as ‘thought’, ‘emotion’, ‘motiva
tion’, and ‘self-esteem’ as if they referred to existing states or entities within the
individual. Yet, one may ask, on what grounds do we make such references? In
many domains, and science in particular, we justify the favored vocabulary through
ostensive definition. In effect, we can point to what we take to be an entity and
declare, ‘that is a cow’, or ‘this is the left hemisphere of the cerebral cortex’. To be
sure, such constructions may be shared only within particular traditions, but the
ability to relate the vocabulary to a publicly shared world of observables can serve
as a local form of grounding. In contrast, there is little way of wedding mental
terms to a world of ostensively designated referents. The Western tradition does
suggest two major candidates for justification: self-observation and observation by
others. In the former case, we might presume that we can know with confidence
about mental states such as self-esteem because we are intimately acquainted with
them. As psychologists often say, we have metacognitive knowledge of our psycho
logical processes. In the case of external observation, we might presume a warrant
for psychological knowledge based on the reasoned inferences of neutrally posi
tioned observers. Let us consider these possibilities further.
First, in the case of knowledge through self-observation, a scan of both philo
sophic and psychological analyses suggests that the very concept of internal
observation is deeply flawed. To succinctly summarize some of the major problems
(for a more extended summary of these arguments, see Gergen, 2009):
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• How can consciousness turn in upon itself to identify its own states? How can
experience become an object to itself? Can a mirror reflect its own image?
• How can one be certain that various mental processes would not obstruct the
attempt to identify one’s states? Could other processes (e.g. repression, defense)
not prevent accurate self-appraisal?
• What are the characteristics of mental states by which one could identify them?
By what criteria does one distinguish, let us say, among states of anger, fear, and
love? What is the color of hope, the size of a thought, or the shape of anger? Why
do none of these attributes seem quite applicable to mental states? Is it because
our observations of the states prove to us that they are not? What would we be
observing in this case?
• By what criterion could one determine that what one experiences as ‘certain
recognition’ of a mental state is indeed certain recognition? Wouldn’t this
recognition (‘I am certain in my assessment’) require yet another round of
self-assessments (‘I am certain that what I am experiencing is certainty... ), the
results of which would require additional processes of internal identification,
and so on in an infinite regress?
• How could one identify an inner state save through an a priori agreement about
what exists in the mind? Could one identify an emotion that was not already
given within the prevailing discourse on emotion? Could a Westerner identify
‘liget’ or ‘amae’ (terms from non-Western cultures)?
• Could one identify one’s mental states through their physiological manifesta
tions—blood pressure, heart rate, etc.? Can one know he or she is ‘thinking’ by
examining one’s blood pressure, or that one has ‘hope’ through a recording of
neurological activity? And, if one did have access to brain scan data, how could
one know to which states such scans referred?
Of course, many contemporary psychologists (along with many psychoanalysts)
are quite willing to abandon the idea of inner observation (or introspection) as a
valid source of psychological knowledge. For many, it is the external observer
rationally systematic and personally dispassionate—who is ideally situated to draw
valid conclusions about people’s internal states. Yet, the past thirty years of poststructural and hermeneutic deliberation leave the presumption of external obser
vation as imperiled as that of introspection. Again in abbreviated form, consider
some of the major flaws;
• If we were to base our knowledge on our subjects’ descriptions of their internal
states (e.g. ‘I am depressed’, ‘I am angry’) how would we know to what the terms
referred within their own mind/brain? We have no access to the states or
conditions. What if one person’s referent for ‘love’ was another s referent for
‘anxiety’? Without access to the putative referents, there would be no means of
sorting out the differences. Indeed, how could one be certain that mental terms
refer to anything at all (e.g. ‘my soul is anguished’)?
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• If we abandon introspection as the basis of knowledge, how can we trust any
self-reports (e.g. ‘I feel... ‘I aspire to ... ‘It is my opinion that... ’) as the
basis of external inference? How could the person know about these conditions,
sufficient that the reports would count as inferential evidence?
• Even if self-reports converge (as in the items making up a self-esteem scale),
how would we know to what (in the individual’s mind/brain) the individual
items referred—if anything (could we not also generate a twelve-item scale of
‘soul anguish’)? How could we trust the subject to know?
• How can we determine the nature of what we are observing, save through the
lens of a theory already established? Could we identify ‘cognitive conservation’
without a theory enabling us to interpret a child’s action in just this way? Could
we observe aggression, moral behavior, altruism, conformity, obedience, or
learning, for example, without a pre-understanding that would call our atten
tion to certain patterns of activity as opposed to others? Can we observe a
‘causal relation’ without at least a rudimentary theory of cause already in place?
Or, in effect, aren’t our observations of psychologically relevant behavior theory
determined?
• If we propose to identify psychological states through their physiological cor
relates (as in ‘the physiology of memory’), how can we determine to what
psychological states the physiology provides the underpinning? If we cannot
determine when a ‘memory’, ‘a thought’, or ‘an agitation of the spirit’ has
occurred, how are we to establish the physiological correlates?
As this brief account suggests, the discourse of the psychological self cannot be
anchored in a referential base sufficient to inspire, direct, or constrain its usage. It is
largely for this reason that the conception of self has been such an inviting topic of
exploration for social constructionist scholars.

The Construction and Critique oe Sele
Inquiry into the social construction of self can roughly be divided into three
categories. The first is primarily concerned with establishing the self as a social
construction; the second is focused on specific social processes in which the
conception of self is embedded; and the third involves critical assessments of the
cultural and political repercussions of traditional beliefs in the self. I consider each
in turn.
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The self in historical and cultural context
One gains an acute appreciation of the extent to which one’s everyday under
standings are both culturally and historically situated—and perhaps precariously
so—through comparisons with commonplace beliefs in other cultures and times.
In this sense, such comparisons not only illustrate the richness in human con
structions of the self, but function as well as a destabilizing device in contemporary
culture. The historical and cultural literature in this case is enormous, and as these
topics are relevant to other discussions in this volume, I will simply earmark here
two significant lines of inquiry. On the historical side, two of the most extensive
accounts of the vicissitudes in Western conceptualizations of the self are those of
Charles Taylor (1989) and Jerrold Siegel (2001). Both explore this history in an
attempt to locate resources for a morally or personally meaningful life. Numerous
other accounts treat the emergence of particular concepts of self within cir
cumscribed historical periods (see e.g. Cary 2000; Cushman 1996; Holstein and
Gubrium 2000). Much the same denaturalization of the self takes place in crosscultural comparisons. Perhaps the major theme that pervades this work is the
comparison between the individuated, bounded, and autonomous view of the self
that is shared within Western culture, and the more socially or communally
embedded vision of the self that may be found in many other cultures of the
world (see e.g. Marsella et al. 1985; Becker 1995; Markus and Kitayama 1991).

The self as social accomplishment
A second significant line of constructionist inquiry builds on the first. If the self is
socially constructed, one asks, how are we to understand the processes central to
this achievement? Echoing the earlier discussion of the literary and rhetorical
contributions to social construction, the major focus of this line of inquiry has
been on discourse practices. To be sure, psycholinguistic study of the relation of
mind (or cognition) to language, along with research into grammar and syntax, for
example, has generated a large corpus of literature. However, within a construc
tionist frame, this tradition has not been engaging. For one, studies relating mind
to language have presumed a dualism between mind and speech that many con
structionists call into question. Further, in its search for ‘the truth about language’,
traditional research was stripped of concern with political and ideological context,
and thus of little relevance for many constructionists.
Inquiry into social achievement of the self has taken two major forms. The first is
concerned with the structure of language and the demands made by linguistic
convention on the conception of self. The second has focused on ongoing conver
sational practices. In the case of language structure, for example, Sampson (2008)
has drawn attention to the binary structure of language and its contribution to the
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self/other dichotomy. As Harre (1991) has also proposed, the existence of personal
pronouns (e.g. I, you, he, me) contributes significantly to an ontology of separate
selves. Perhaps the most prominent form of inquiry linking discursive structure to
conceptions of self has centered on narrative. Drawing from a long-standing
emphasis in semiotic studies on the formative influence of narrative structure,
scholars have variously explored the way in which conceptions of the self are
guided by a narrative forestructure. As MacIntyre (1984) cogently argued, one’s
conception of self, and indeed one’s moral integrity, emerges from one’s narrative
of self. It is the form of this narrative, as shared within an interpretive tradition,
that underlies one’s sense of self. The work of Gergen and Gergen (1983), Sarbin
(1986), Polkinghorne (1988), Rosenwald and Ochberg (1990), and Bruner (1990)
has given the study of narrative a prominent place in the psychology of the self. The
long-standing concern in psychology with life history has also been highly con
genial to narrative study. The work of Dan McAdams (1985,1997) has underscored
the centrality of narrative not only to self-understanding but to the trajectory of
one’s actions. His inquiry into ‘redemptive narratives’ has also fired interest in the
relationship of self-understanding and spiritual traditions (McAdams, 2006).
The second major line of inquiry into the self as a social accomplishment has
been concerned with ongoing interaction. Such inquiry was initially stimulated by
the work of Harold Garfinkel (1967) and the ethnomethods by which realities are
constituted within conversation. The link between ethnomethodology and the
psychological self was secured in Jeff Coulter’s 1979 volume. The Social Construction
of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic Philosophy. Coulter’s work
demonstrated the ways in which the self is continuously fashioned and refashioned
as conversation unfolds. Inquiry into discursive positioning (Davies and Harre,
1990; Van Langenhove and Harre, 1998) offered subsequent insight into a critical
aspect of this process. The concern in this case is with the way in which conversa
tional interlocutors position each other’s identity as they speak. However, while
further work in discourse and conversational analysis adds depth and richness to
these views, such inquiry reaches a juncture at which the specifically psychological
self is no longer in focus (see e.g. Benwell and Stokoe 2006, and Buchholtz 1999).
Such inquiry focuses almost exclusively on the spoken or written word, while
simultaneously placing the ‘conversational object’ at ontological risk. Thus, an
alysts will demonstrate how conversational references to the self deconstruct the
psychological referent. Attention is then drawn to publicly defined identity.

Critical reflection on the psychological self
For the constructionist, the realities created by people together are functionally
insinuated into their daily relationships. The discursive ontologies and ethics are
embedded within normal and normative practices. Or, more succinctly, the
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discourses of daily life are constitutive of living traditions. In this sense, scholars
have been concerned with the way in which vocabularies of the self both rationalize
and sustain cultural practices. It is in this vein that many constructionists have
drawn sustenance from Foucault’s (1978,1979) writings on knowledge and power.
Language, for Foucault, serves as a major medium for carrying out relations.
Because language constitutes what we take to be the world, and rationalizes the
form of reality thus created, it also serves as a socially binding force. By acting
within language, relations of power and privilege are sustained. And, by engaging
in the further circulation of a form of language, the array of power relations is
further extended (see Rose 1985,1990)In particular, as many critics see it, there is a substantial dark side to constructing
a world of individual and agentic selves. When a fundamental distinction between
self and other is established, the social world is constituted in terms of differences.
The individual stands as an isolated entity, essentially alone and alienated. Further,
such a view lends itself to a prizing of autonomy—of becoming a ‘self-made man’,
who ‘does it my way’. To be dependent is a sign of weakness and incapacity. To
construct a world of separation in this way is also to court distrust; one can never
be certain of the other’s motives. And given distrust, it becomes reasonable to ‘take
care of number one’. Self-gain becomes an unquestionable motive, within both the
sciences (such as economics and social psychology) and the culture at large. In this
context, loyalty, commitment, and community are all thrown into question, as all
may potentially interfere with ‘self-realization’. Such views represent an extended
critique of Western individualism. (See e.g. Gelpi 1989; Hewitt 1989; Bellah et al.
1985; Heller et al. 1986; Lasch 1978; Leary 2004.)
These critiques become more pointed in their implications when self
dysfunction is considered. At the outset, an extensive literature illuminates the
constructed character of the psychiatric concepts of mental illness, and points to
the ideological and political interests served by diagnostic categorization. Thus, for
example, scholars have explored the social construction of schizophrenia (Sarbin
and Mancuso 1980), anorexia (Hepworth 1999), depression (Blazer 2005), attention
deficit disorder (Divorky and Schrag 1975), post traumatic stress disorder (Quosh
and Gergen 2008), and many other forms of ‘mental disorder’ (see e.g. Neimeyer
2000; Fee 2000). These deconstructions of illness categories have been accom
panied by critical assessments of the impact on both clients and the society more
generally. For example, diagnostic categories are variously seen as devices used
largely for purposes of social control (e.g. client management, insurance justifica
tion), that mystify the values agendas they express, and sustain the myth of mental
health practice as medical science in such a way that problems in living are
increasingly treated with pharmaceutical suppressants (Kutchins and Kirk 1997;
Szasz 1961). Further, by disseminating ‘knowledge of mental illness’ to the culture,
people cease to examine the societal conditions that may favor depression or
hyperactivity, for example, and increasingly come to construct themselves in
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these terms (Gergen 2006; Hare-Mustin 1994). Further, to be categorized as men
tally ill frequently increases the anguish of those who bear the labels. To hear voices,
to be hyperactive, or to be chronically sad, for example, is not inherently to possess
an illness, and there are more beneficial constructions possible (Parker et al. 1995).

The Relational Self
The preceding critiques of the psychological self have brought about an active
movement to reconceptualize the mind in general, and the self in particular. The
attempt in this case is to construct an ontology that replaces the vision of the
bounded self as the atom of the social world with relational process. From this
standpoint, it would not be selves who come together to form relationships, but
relational process out of which the very idea of the psychological self could emerge.
As can be seen, the development of such a view follows congenially from the
constructionist perspective so instrumental in denaturalizing the traditional view
of the psychological self. If what we call knowledge emerges from social process,
then social process stands as an ontological prior to the individual.
Relational explorations draw nourishment from a number of early lines of
scholarship. Phenomenologists have long been concerned with the arbitrary char
acter of the mind/world dichotomy. For example, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
proposed that all experience is intentional, essentially directed toward or absorbed
by some pattern (object, person, etc.). Thus, conscious experience is fundamentally
relational; subject and object—or self and other—are unified within experience.
For many psychologists George Herbert Mead’s volume. Mind, Self and Society was
the first important step toward a relational account of self. As Mead proposed,
there is no thinking, or indeed any sense of being a self, that is independent of
social process. For Mead, we are born with rudimentary capacities to adjust to each
other, largely in response to gestures—with the hands, vocal sounds, facial expres
sions, gaze, and so on. It is through others’ response to our gestures that we slowly
begin to develop the capacities for mental symbolization; as others respond to our
gestures, and we experience these responses within us, we are able to gain a sense of
what the other’s gesture symbolizes for him or her. ‘No hard-and-fast line can be
drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist
and enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and
enter as such in our experience also’ (Mead 1934).
The work of Lev Vygotsky (1978) also offered a bold alternative to the dominant
conception of mind independent from social process. For Vygotsky, individuals are
inextricably related, both to each other and to their physical surrounds. Of particular
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interest for Vygotsky were the ‘higher mental functions’ such as thinking, planning,
attending, and remembering. For Vygotsky, these higher processes are lodged
within relationships: ‘social relations or relations among people genetically under
lie all higher (mental) functions and their relationships.’ In effect, mental func
tioning reflects social process. On the psychoanalytic front, theory has shifted
toward ‘object relations’ (or the mental representation of others). Here therapists
have become increasingly concerned with the complex relations between transfer
ence and counter-transference. As relational analysts propose, it is no longer
possible to view the therapist as a neutral investigator of the client’s mind, as the
therapist’s psychological functioning cannot be extricated from that of the client.
Literary theory has also served as a vital stimulus to theorizing a relational self.
Bakhtin’s explorations of dialogicality in the novel have been especially significant.
As Bakhtin (1981) reasons, self and other are locked together in the generation of
meaning: ‘Consciousness is never self-sufficient, it always finds itself in an intense
relationship with another consciousness.’ Or, in brief, ‘To be means to commu
nicate.’
With these resources serving as a vital background, the question emerges as to
whether it is possible to eliminate entirely the ‘thinker behind the words’. Wittgen
stein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) provides the groundwork for such a
venture. For Wittgenstein, language obtains its meaning and significance primarily
from the way in which it is used in human interaction. Thus, for example, the
meaning of‘yellow card’ and ‘corner kick’ gain their significance from their use in
the game of soccer. This same logic may be applied to the discourse of the self, and
in particular, to the way in which one refers to states of mind. We may expand on
the implications with the following propositions.
1. The self as discursive action. As we have seen, there is no viable way of under
standing such utterances as ‘I decided’ or ‘I am angry’ as reports on what we
presume to be an inner state of mind. We may thus relinquish the view of such
discourse as a manifestation or ‘outward expression of an inner world’. Rather, we
may view the meaning of such discourse as dependent upon its use in relationships.
Thus, to announce, ‘I am unhappy’ about a given state of affairs, the term
‘unhappy’ would not be rendered meaningful or appropriate by virtue of its
manifesting the state of one’s neurons, emotions, or cognitive schema. Rather,
the report plays a significant social function. It may be used, for example, to call an
end to a set of deteriorating conditions, enlist support and/or encouragement, or
to invite further opinion. Both the conditions of the report and the functions it can
serve are also circumscribed by social convention. The phrase ‘I am deeply sad’ can
be satisfactorily reported at the death of a close relative but not the demise of a
spring moth. A report of depression can secure others’ concern and support;
however it cannot easily function as a greeting, an invitation to laughter, or a
commendation. In this sense to use mental language is more like a handshake or an
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embrace than a mirror of the interior. In effect, mental terms are used by people to
carry out relationships.
2. Discourse of the self as performance. As theorists further reason, we are not
dealing here with ‘mere words’ used by people to ‘get what they want from the
other’. One’s utterances are essentially performative in function. That is, in the very
saying of something, one is also performing an action within a relationship. As
performance, more than the felicitous use of words is required. For example, if
spoken in a faint voice, eyes on the floor, and with a smile, the words ‘I am angry’
would constitute a failed performance. It would be culturally bewildering. In order
to perform anger properly within Western culture, voice intensity and volume are
essential; a stern face and a rigid posture may be required. Much is gained, then, by
replacing the image of private ‘feelings’ with public action; it is not that one has
emotions, a thought, or a memory so much as one does them.
3. Discursive action as relationally embedded. If it is reasonable to view psycho
logical discourse as embedded within an embodied performance, one may then
inquire into its origins. If there is no animating origin lying behind the action, one
is then drawn to its roots within relationship. In the same way that one cannot
achieve intelligibility by using a word of his own creation, one’s actions will not
make sense if they do not borrow from a cultural tradition. Thus, the performance
of self carries a history of relationships, manifesting and extending them. One may
also ask about audience; for whom are these intelligible performances? As Bakhtin
(1981) pointed out, to speak is always to address someone—either explicitly or
implicitly—within some kind of relationship. This is also to say that the perfor
mances are fashioned with respect to the recipient. The other enters expressions of
the self in their very formulation.

The relational rewriting of self
Relational theorizing of this sort has been a significant stimulus to a range of
constructionist inquiry, which together essentially reconfigures both the concep
tion of the psychological self and its implications for practice. In one of the earliest
provocations of this kind. Potter and Wetherell (1987) demonstrated the problems
inhering in the supposition that attitudes in the head cause overt public actions. As
they went on to demonstrate, an attitude is more fruitfully understood as a public
action in itself, or essentially, a position taken in a conversation. Much the same
line of argument may be applied to the concept of reason. Replacing the Cartesian
view of thinking as that process establishing the very certitude of self, reasoning
may be viewed as a form of public performance. As Billig (1987) has proposed,
most of what we take to be rational thought is more adequately viewed as a social
process of argumentation. We do not argue because we have private thoughts, but
rather, private thinking comes into being through the social practice of
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argumentation. What we consider ‘good reasoning’, then, is not distinguishable
from effective rhetoric.
Echoing this line of reasoning is a substantial movement focused on communal
memory. Common conceptions of memory—and indeed the conceptions that
ground most scientific study of memory—presume the existence of an interior
process. Following the preceding line of reasoning, however, one may consider the
word ‘memory’ in its performative role. It makes little sense to view the phrase
‘I remember’ as a report on a particular psychological or neurological condition.
What kind of condition would one be reporting on, how would one be able to ‘look
inside’ and recognize when we had a memory as opposed to a ‘thought’ or a ‘desire’.
Rather, as John Shotter has put it, ‘Our ways of talking about our experiences
work not primarily to represent the nature of those experiences in themselves,
but to represent them in such a way as to constitute and sustain one or another
kind of social order’ (1990: 145). In effect, memory is not an individual act but a
collective one.
In this sense, if a school child is asked ‘what does three times three equal?’ the
answer ‘nine’ is not a report on an inner condition of memory, but an action that
has been fashioned within a complex relational history. And when the family
gathers at a reunion, the stories of yore are not pictures of their minds, but
forms of conversation that have typically been incubated in a long history of
conversation. In their study of how people recall political events—such as wars
or revolutions—the researchers conclude, ‘Every memory, as personal as it may
be—even of events that are private and strictly personal and have not been shared
with anyone—exists through its relation with what has been shared with others:
language, idiom, events, and everything that shapes the society of which indivi
duals are a part.’ For an extended review of the literature on collective or relational
memory the reader may consult Middleton and Brown (2005).
A final line of inquiry adds further dimension to this relational reconstruction of
self. One tends to think of emotions as ‘natural givens’, simply part of one’s
biological makeup. We generally assume that infants are born into the world
with fully functioning emotions; a child’s cry is taken as a sign of anger, and a
smile as an expression of happiness. Psychologists attempt to locate the physiolog
ical basis of emotion, and argue for its universality. The argument for universality
is appealing on one level, as it suggests that human understanding is part of our
biological makeup. We are innately prepared, for example, to appreciate another’s
fear or love or joy. Yet, it is also a dangerous assumption, in as much as what one
assumes to be ‘natural’ is typically the emotions of one’s own culture. What the
Ifaluk call/ago or the Japanese call mayae, for example, we in the West simply delete
from the universal vocabulary of emotion.
In the present context, it is more helpful to view emotional expressions as
relational performances. More specifically, one may employ the concept of a
relational scenario, that is, a scripted set of interdependent actions such as one
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might find in a stage performance. Each action in the scenario sets the stage for that
which follows; what follows gives intelligibility to that which has preceded. In
effect, the performance of each actor is required to give the play its coherent unity;
each performance depends on the others for its intelligibility. In these terms, one
can view emotional performances as constituents of culturally specific scenarios—
parts of a play in which others are required. This is to propose that the angry shout
or the sluggish expression of depression only make sense by virtue of their position
in a relational scenario. That is, such expressions cannot take place anywhere and
anytime, but only within a culturally appropriate sequence. One cannot easily
jump to his feet in the middle of family dinner and shout, T am so sorry’; such
behavior would be unintelligible. But if accused of an implicitly racist remark, the
same expression would not only seem fitting, but desirable. More generally, there
are socially prescribed times and places where it is appropriate to perform an
emotion.
Further, once an emotion is performed the relational scenario also prescribes
what follows. Thus, if a friend announces that he fears he has a fatal disease, certain
actions are virtually required by the cultural scenarios and others prohibited. One
may properly respond with sympathy and nurturance, but it would be tasteless to
reply with a silly joke or talk about one s vacation. Further, like good stories, many
emotional scenarios also have beginnings and endings. If it is late at night and one’s
electric power is suddenly lost, that is the beginning of a scenario in which
expressions of fear (as opposed, for example, to jealously or ecstasy) would be
appropriate. In contrast, if someone is reporting one’s sorrow, another may
continue to give nurturance and support until the sorrow subsides. At that point
the scenario is terminated.
The relational reconstruction of the self has naturally given rise to a range of
criticism. Two of these critical points are most prominent. In the first case, critics
charge that such relational views create a black box or empty organism, bereft of all
subjective life. In reply, the relational theorist points to the desirability of abandon
ing dualism, and the problematic distinction between inner and outer, between self
and identity. This is not to deny that one is doing something privately in one’s
prolonged gaze into the distance as one begins to write an essay. However, it is a
mistake if it is proposed to view this silent period specifically in terms of psychologicul processes, that is, functioning according to their own autonomous de
mands. Rather, the relational theorist proposes, when preparing to write, one is
readying oneself to put socially intelligible statements on paper, that is, preparing
to engage in a social action. Thus, one may be doing something privately—which
we might want to call reasoning, pondering, or feeling—but from the relational
standpoint these are essentially public actions carried out in private. To illustrate,
consider the actress preparing her lines for a play. The lines are essentially nonsense
independent of their placement within the play; that is, they require a relationship
to be intelligible. Yet, the actress can rehearse the lines in private, quietly
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performing the words without voicing them. We might say she was ‘imagining’ or
‘thinking them through’. But essentially she is carrying out a public action, only
without audience and full performance. In effect, they are partial performances
(Gergen 2009).
The second significant critique is that a relational view represents an eradication
of individual agency, and thus undermines long-standing traditions of moral
responsibility. To this the relational constructionist replies that there is no eradica
tion of tradition implied. The relational account is itself a construction, and not a
truth posit. No traditions need be abandoned; however, all may be subjected to
critical reflection. At this point, questions may be raised concerning the wisdom,
and indeed the justice, of holding single individuals responsible for their actions.
Not only do such practices generate alienation and resentment, but in selecting a
target of scorn, they relieve those in judgment from assaying their own contribu
tion to the unwanted outcome. In contrast, the relational theorist proposes, a
relational account abandons the determinist/voluntarist antinomy of long stand
ing, and shifts the concern with ‘wrong-doing’ to the collaborative practices that
may be viewed as its origin. One begins to inquire into practices of justice that may
sustain viable relationships as opposed to severing them.
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